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Encounters on the street 
between the police and the 
citizen take on a variety of 
forms. These encounters range 
from friendly exchanges of 
greetings, innocuous social 
conversation, useful information 
sharing to highly charged and volatile arrest situations. 
Transcending the “investigative” spectrum are 
essentially three levels of street encounters between 
the police and the citizens they serve.  
 
Consensual 
Encounters 
Investigative 
Detention 
Arrest 
IN THIS ISSUE 
 
Investigative Detention: Canada’s Stop & Frisk…..1 
 
Consensual Encounters (Field Inquiries) 
 
The law recognizes that a police officer is entitled to 
approach and question any person, however there is no 
general power for the police to detain the person for 
questioning1 nor compel answers. The individual is free to 
ignore police questions and may exercise that right by 
walking (or running) away. The officer's motivation for 
such an encounter is often driven by curiosity and the 
officer seeks contact with the person, perhaps inquiring 
into circumstances surrounding the persons presence (a 
new face), chatting with people on their beat (the 
essence of community policing), or questioning persons of 
potential interest in an investigation. The officer 
approaches the person and contact is made through 
inquisitive dialogue. The person may leave at anytime and 
                                                 
1 R. v. Esposito (1985) 24 C.C.C. (3d) 88 (Ont.C.A.) leave to appeal to the S.C.C. refused (1986), see 
also R. v. Moran (1987) 36 C.C.C. (3d) 225 (Ont.C.A.) at p. 258, R. v. Willimott [2000] O.J. No. 1530 
(Ont.S.Crt.Jus.),., R. v. Dedman  (1981) 59 C.C.C. (2d) 97 (Ont.C.A.) at p.108-109, see also comments 
of Melnick J. in R. v. Arkinstall [1994] B.C.J. No.612 (B.C.S.C.) at para.37. 
 
 
the officer must let the individual proceed. In this sense 
the contact is mutual, to be terminated by either the 
officer or the individual. A non-consensual search is not 
permitted during this encounter, nor may a person be 
compelled to remain in the presence of the officer, 
compelled to empty their pockets, compelled to answer 
questions, or compelled to identify themselves. 
 
Arrest 
 
A lawful arrest requires both a legal and factual basis. 
Firstly, the arrest must be authorized by law. The 
officer must be able to point to a statute or common 
law authority permitting the arrest. Generally, a 
factual predicate of reasonable grounds2 must exist. If 
one or both of these criteria are not satisfied the 
arrest is unlawful. With an arrest, a reasonably 
conducted incidental protective and evidentiary search 
is permitted. In addition, a person may be taken into 
custody, subjected to an interrogation, and must 
identify themselves or be subject to an obstruction 
charge3. 
 
Between a field inquiry and an arrest lies an 
investigative detention. Like an arrest, an investigative 
detention requires both a legal and factual predicate. 
When existing, a valid investigative detention is 
permitted. Although an investigative detention is 
similar to an arrest in that 
it is a forced encounter, it 
is distinguishable in 
purpose, character, and 
extent. 
 
THE AMERICAN EXPER
 
Although Canadian courts re
decisions can be transplanted
only with the greatest cautio
reasoning in Terry v. Ohio [3
equally to the Canadian exper
                                          
2 See Volume 1 Issue 3 of this publication for a review
3 R. v. Moore [1979]  1 S.C.R. 195., see s.129 Criminal C
4 Hunter et al. V. Southam Inc. (1984) 14 C.C.C. (3d) 9
Volume 1 Issue 7 
September 2001 IENCE 
cognize that "American 
 to the Canadian context 
n4", the BCCA held "the 
92 U.S. 1 (1968)] applies 
ience" and "[t]he concept 
       
 of reasonable grounds. 
ode. 
7 at p. 109. 
 of ‘stop and frisk’ meets the Waterfield test5"6. 
Before discussing the Canadian concept of investigative 
detention as it has developed, it would be appropriate 
to first  examine its U.S. counterpart; “stop and frisk”. 
The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes the general 
interest of the government in "effective crime 
prevention and detection" warrants a police officer on 
the street "in appropriate circumstances and in an 
appropriate manner [to] approach a person for the 
purpose of investigating [possible] criminal behaviour 
even though there is no probable cause7 to make an 
arrest8". For a stop to be lawful it must be both 
justified at inception and be reasonably related in 
scope to the circumstances. 
 
Justified at Inception 
 
A police officer lacking the level of information 
necessary for probable cause to arrest is not required 
"to simply shrug [their] shoulders and allow a crime to 
occur or a criminal escape9". The police may stop and 
briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if 
the officer has a reasonable suspicion10 supported by 
articulable facts that criminal activity "may be afoot", 
even if the officer lacks probable cause11.  
 
The concept of reasonable suspicion is not "readily, or 
even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules"12. In 
fact, there could be circumstances in which wholly 
lawful conduct might justify suspicion that criminal 
activity is afoot13. However, the relevant inquiry is not 
whether particular conduct is "innocent" or "guilty" but 
the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular 
types of non-criminal acts14. Where conduct justifying 
a stop is suspicious, but "ambiguous and susceptible to 
innocent explanation", officers may detain the person 
to resolve the ambiguity15. In Houston v. Clark County 
Sheriff Deputy 174 F.3d 809 (6th Cir.1999), the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the standard of 
suspicion required for a permissible investigative 
detention: 
                                                 
5 The Waterfield test is derived from an English case R. v. Waterfield [1963] 3 All E.R. 659, 
commonly referred to as the ancillary power doctrine.  
6 R. v. Ferris (1998) 126 C.C.C. (3d) 298 (B.C.C.A.) appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed 
[1998] S.C.C.A. No. 424, 
7 The Canadain equivalent of "probable cause" is "reasonable grounds to believe". See Hunter et al. 
V. Southam Inc. (1984) 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 at p. 114. 
8 Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1 (1968) at p. 22. 
9 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145 (1972) 
10 Other terms used to define a reasonable suspicion include individualized suspicion, reasonable 
cause, specific and articulable facts, particularized and objective basis for suspecting, 
independently suspicious circumstances, articulable reasons, founded suspicion, particularized 
suspicion, substantial possibility, and individualized suspicion. Standards not amounting to a 
reasonable suspicion include pop guess, inchoate and unparticularized suspicion, off chance, or a 
hunch. 
11 See U.S. v. Sokolow 490 U.S. 1 (1989) at p.7. 
12 See U.S. v. Sokolow 490 U.S. 1 (1989) at p.7 citing Illinois v. Gates 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). 
13 See Reid v. Georgia 448 U.S. 438 (1980) per curiam. 
14 U.S. v. Sokolow 490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989)  
15 Illinois v, Wardlow U.S. Supreme Court No. 98-1036 decided January 12, 2000. 
 
Police may briefly stop an individual for investigation if they have 
a “reasonable suspicion” that the individual has committed a 
crime….”Reasonable suspicion” is more than an ill-defined hunch; it 
must be based upon “a particularized and objective basis for 
suspecting the particular person…of criminal activity.”…It 
requires “specific and articulable facts which, taken together 
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant” an 
investigatory stop…. The standard…is not onerous. The requisite 
level of suspicion “is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing 
by a preponderance of the evidence….Moreover, reasonable 
suspicion can arise from evidence that is less reliable than what 
might be required to show probable cause. (references omitted)  
 
In forming a reasonable suspicion, a police officer is 
entitled to assess the facts in light of their 
experience16 and may draw inferences and make 
deductions that could elude any untrained person 
observing the same conduct17. It is not a requirement 
the suspicion be based solely on an officer's personal 
observation but may be based on "information supplied 
by another person"18. A person's presence in an area of 
expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough 
to support a reasonable suspicion a person is 
committing a crime19. However, "officers are not 
required to ignore relevant characteristics of a 
location in determining whether the circumstances are 
sufficiently suspicious to warrant further 
investigation" and a person's presence in a high crime 
area is a relevant fact to be considered20. Similarly, 
unprovoked flight from the police, is insufficient on its 
own to warrant an investigative detention. Unprovoked 
flight from police, although not necessarily indicative 
of wrongdoing, is certainly suggestive of such and may 
contribute to a reasonable suspicion "based on 
commonsense judgements and inferences about human 
behaviour"21. In assessing reasonable suspicion, the 
“the whole picture" must be considered22.  
 
Reasonably Related in Scope 
 
The detention must be "brief23" and “last no longer 
than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop"24. In assessing whether the stop was too long, 
the Court must “examine whether the police diligently 
pursued a means of investigation that was likely to 
confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which 
                                                 
16 U.S. v. Brigoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (opinion of Powell J.) 
17 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 524 (1983) (footnote 5) (opinion of Rehnquist J. in dissent) 
18 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972) 
19 Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) 
20 Illinois v, Wardlow U.S. Supreme Court No. 98-1036 decided January 12, 2000. 
21 Illinois v, Wardlow U.S. Supreme Court No. 98-1036 decided January 12, 2000. 
22 See U.S. v. Sokolow 490 U.S. 1 (1989) at p.7 citing U.S. v. Cortez 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). 
23 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 510 (1983) 
24 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501 (1983) 
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 time it was necessary to detain”25. Courts must avoid 
“unrealistic second-guessing” and engaging in “post hoc 
evaluation of police conduct” by imagining some 
alternative means by which the objectives of the 
detention might have been accomplished26. Forcibly 
removing a detainee from their home or other place in 
which they are entitled to be, and transporting that 
person to a police station for an investigative purpose, 
even though for a brief time, is not permitted27. 
 
U.S. courts recognize that when a suspect is 
"dangerous", they are no less dangerous simply because 
they are not arrested28. If an officer is entitled to 
make an investigative stop and has reason to believe 
the suspect is dangerous, a search limited in scope for 
the purpose of protecting the officer may be 
undertaken29. With respect to the "frisk search", the 
Court in Terry held they could not "blind [themselves] 
to the need of law enforcement officers to protect 
themselves and other prospective victims of violence in 
situations where they lacked probable cause for an 
arrest". However, the scope of the search must be 
"strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify 
its initiation". To this end, a protective search of a 
detained person in the absence of probable cause must 
be limited in scope to a search necessary for the 
discovery of weapons that might be used to harm the 
officer or others nearby.  
 
 
This protective search incidental to the "stop" does 
not carry with it the relatively extensive explorative 
search that accompanies a search incident to arrest 
(fruits or instrumentalities of the crime, or evidence). 
The Supreme Court made it clear that the officer need 
not be certain the individual is armed with a weapon, 
but "whether a reasonably prudent [person] in the 
circumstances would be warranted in the belief that 
[their] safety or that of others was in danger"30.  
 
To engage in an area search for safety (weapons) "the 
officer must have an articulable suspicion that the 
suspect is potentially dangerous"31. A limited protective 
search authorizes the search of the passenger 
compartment (interior) of a motor vehicle provided the 
officer restricts the search to those areas where the 
detainee would generally have immediate control and 
could contain a weapon32. In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 
1032 (1983), the U.S. Supreme Court stated: 
                                                 
25 U.S. v. Sharpe et al 470 U.S. (1985) per Buregr C.J. 
26 U.S. v. Sharpe et al 470 U.S. (1985) 
27 Hayes v. Florida 470 U.S. 811 (1985) 
28 See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) at p.1050 
29 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) 
30 Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1 (1968) 
31 Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1983) (footnote 16) 
 
Just as a Terry suspect on the street may, despite being under 
the brief control of a police officer, reach into his clothing and 
retrieve a weapon, so might a Terry suspect…break away from the 
police control and retrieve a weapon from his automobile  
 
If during the search, the officer should discover 
contraband other than weapons, the officer "cannot be 
required to ignore the contraband", and its seizure is 
lawful and does not violate the Fourth Amendment.  
 
THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE 
 
Detention: The Stop 
 
Investigative detention, 
as it is known in Canada, 
is a common law power 
that authorizes police 
officers to briefly 
detain individuals in the course of a police investigation 
(even in the absence of reasonable grounds to effect 
an arrest33) and deals with “on-the-street observations 
by police officer’s who must act quickly”34. In R. v. 
Dedman [1985] 2 S.C.R. 2 (S.C.C.), Dickson C.J. stated 
that "short of arrest, the police have never possessed 
legal authority at common law to detain anyone against 
[their] will for questioning, or to pursue an 
investigation".  Although this statement would appear 
to prohibit forced encounters other than arrest, it 
addressed a purely arbitrary stop (no articulable cause) 
and not the developed concept of investigative 
detention. Within the last decade, Canadian courts 
have recognized, largely by adopting American 
jurisprudence in the area of "stop and frisk", that 
police do have a common law authority to detain 
individuals for the purpose of an investigation.  
 
Investigative detention recognizes the police have the 
general duties of investigating and preventing criminal 
activity35. However, "the fact that a police officer has 
a general duty…does not mean that [they] can use any 
or all means of achieving these ends36". As such, a valid 
investigative detention involves a two-prong analysis to 
determine its validity. The officer must have an 
                                                 
32 See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) 
33 R. v. Bisson 2000 ABPC 30 at para. 21. 
34 R. v. Ferris (1998126 C.C.C. (3d) 298 (B.C.C.A.) application for appeal to the S.C.C. dismissed 
[1998] S.C.C.A. No. 424 (S.C.C.) at p.309. 
35 R. v. Ferris (1998126 C.C.C. (3d) 298 (B.C.C.A.) application for appeal to the S.C.C. dismissed 
[1998] S.C.C.A. No. 424 (S.C.C.) at p.307, R. v. Simpson (1993) 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482 (Ont.C.A.) at p499. 
36 R. v. Dedman [1985] 2 S.C.R. 2 (S.C.C.) per Dickson C.J. at p.12. 
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 articulable cause and the detention must be reasonably 
justified in the circumstances. 
 
¾ articulable cause. Did the police officer who 
initiated the detention have an articulable cause 
sufficient to support an investigative detention?37 
In justifying a detention, “the police need not 
perform a legal analysis as to whether an offence 
could be made out; rather, they must determine 
whether there is an ‘articulable cause’ for such 
detention”38. An articulable cause requirement 
properly balances societal’s interest in the police 
detecting and preventing crime (the need for 
police enquiry) and the liberty interests of the 
individual (to be free from police detention)39.  
 
¾ reasonably justified. Was the detention and the 
measures employed by the police officer in the 
course of the detention reasonably warranted and 
justified in the circumstances? The nature of the 
detention must be circumscribed by the reasons 
warranting it. A detention that exceeds the 
boundaries imposed by the common law may be 
found to be an unjustifiable use of police powers.  
 
Articulable Cause 
 
"Articulable cause" is a legal standard providing 
justification for state action (ie. detention) and is the 
yardstick by which an arbitrary detention is measured. 
"Articulable cause" is a "reasonable suspicion40" and 
has been synonymously referred to as reasonable cause 
to suspect41, a reasonable basis to suspect42, 
particularized and objective basis for suspecting43, a 
reasonable and articulable suspicion44, reasonably 
based suspicion45, objectively based high level of 
suspicion46, or reasonable grounds to suspect47. A 
reasonable suspicion lies between subjectively based 
suspicion (mere suspicion or curiosity), and reasonable 
belief48 or grounds. It is considered a lesser but 
included standard of reasonable grounds and is clearly 
not as high49. A hunch50, unfounded suspicion51, 
speculation52, intuition53, or guess54 do not amount to 
articulable cause. In articulable cause cases "the 
circumstances as a whole [cry] out for further 
investigation55". Doherty J.A. in R. v. Simpson (1993) 
79 C.C.C. (3d) 482 (Ont.C.A.) defined investigative 
articulable cause as: 
                                                 
37 See R. v. Hall (1995) 22 O.R. (3d) 289 (Ont.C.A.), R. v. Simpson (1993) 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482 
(Ont.C.A.), R. v. Ferris (1998126 C.C.C. (3d) 298 (B.C.C.A.) application for appeal to the S.C.C. 
dismissed [1998] S.C.C.A. No. 424 (S.C.C.), R. v. Johnson [2000] B.C.C.A. 
38 R. v. Reid  [2000] O.J. No.2969 (Ont.P.C.) 
39 R. v. Ferris (1998126 C.C.C. (3d) 298 (B.C.C.A.) application for appeal to the S.C.C. dismissed 
[1998] S.C.C.A. No. 424 (S.C.C.) at p.308, R. v. Simpson (1993) 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482 (Ont.C.A.) 
40 See R. v. Lal [1998] B.C.J. No. 2446 (B.C.C.A.) leave to appeal to dismissed [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 28 
(S.C.C.), R. v. Simpson (1993) 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482 (Ont.C.A.) at p503. 
41 R. v. Brisson 2000 ABPC 30 at para. 24., see also R. v. Perrault [1992] R.J.Q. 1848 (Que.C.A.) at 
p.183 
42 R. v. J.R. [2000] O.J. No. 930 (Ont.S.C.J.) at para.15. 
43 R. v. Lee [1993] B.C.J. No.1220 (B.C.S.C.) 
 
45 R. v. Simpson (1993) 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482 (Ont.C.A.) at p503. 
46 R. v. Pena [1996] B.C.J. No.2821 (B.C.S.C.) at para.36. 
47 R. v. Burke (1997) 118 C.C.C. (3d) 59 Nfld.C.A.) per Marshall J.A. at p.76. 
48 R. v. Granston (2000) Docket: C29926 (Ont.C.A.) 
 
[A] constellation of objectively discernible facts which give the 
detaining officer reasonable cause to suspect that the detainee 
is criminally implicated in the activity under investigation.  
 
Articulable cause, like reasonable belief, “must be both 
subjectively held and objectively verifiable"56. 
Objectively, a court "must be supplied with sufficient 
information to support an independent judgement that 
there was articulable cause to make the stop"57. The 
objective standard provides a constitutionally 
recognized basis by which a neutral arbiter may judge 
the conduct of the police. This is similar to the 
reasonable grounds standard authorizing arrest "and 
serves to avoid indiscriminate and discriminatory 
exercises of the police power58". Succinctly, the "police 
officer must be able to demonstrate an objective basis 
in fact that gives rise to [their] suspicion59". In 
comparing the standard of reasonable grounds to  
articulable cause, Osborne J.A. in R. v. Hall (1995) 22 
O.R. (3d) 289 (Ont.C.A.) stated: 
 
Both "articulable cause" and "reasonable and probable grounds", 
as related to an investigative detention and an arrest without 
warrant respectively, are subject to objective assessment. That 
is to say there must be a constellation of objectively discernible 
facts amounting to articulable cause for a lawful investigative 
detention and a constellation of objectively discernible facts 
amounting to reasonable and probable grounds for a lawful arrest 
without warrant 
 
Acknowledging "the officer has to make a quick 
judgement 'in the field' as to whether [they] should 
intervene", it is sufficient that the facts objectively 
observed "give rise to a reasonable suspicion of the 
existence of potentially illegal activity which would 
justify intervention"60. The combination of the facts 
                                                 
49 R. v. Pearce (1997) 120 C.C.C. (3d) 467 (Nfld.C.A.) at p.470 
50 R. v. Pearce (1997) 120 C.C.C. (3d) 467 (Nfld.C.A.) at p.470, R. v. F.L. [1996] B.C.J. No. 3010 
(B.C.S.C.) Lander J. at para. 15, R. v. Simpson (1993) 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482 (Ont.C.A.) at p.501. 
51 R. v. Arkinstall [1994] B.C.J. No.612 (B.C.S.C.) at para.40. 
52 See R. v. Cox [1999] N.B.J. No. 86 (QL) (N.B.C.A.) per Ryan J.A. at para.12, R. v. Simpson (1993) 
79 C.C.C. (3d) 482 (Ont.C.A.) at p502. 
53 R. v. Lal (1996) Docket:CC940845 (B.C.S.C.) affirmed [1998] B.C.J. No. 2446 (B.C.C.A.) leave to 
appeal to dismissed [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 28 (S.C.C.), 
54 See R. v. Cox [1999] N.B.J. No. 86 (QL) (N.B.C.A.) per Ryan J.A. at para.12, R. v. Simpson (1993) 
79 C.C.C. (3d) 482 (Ont.C.A.) at p502. 
55 See R. v. D.I. [1996] B.C.J. No. 2750 (QL) (B.C.YouthCt.) per Rae Youth Ct. J. at para.17. 
56 R. v. F.L. [1996] B.C.J. No. 3010 (B.C.S.C.) Lander J. at para. 15.. 
57 R. v. Lal [1998] B.C.J. No. 2446 (B.C.C.A.) leave to appeal to dismissed [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 28 
(S.C.C.) 
58 R. v. Simpson (1993) 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482 (Ont.C.A.) 
59 See R. v. Mulligan [2000] O.J. No. 59 (Ont.C.A.) 
60 R. v. Pearce (1997) 120 C.C.C. (3d) 467 (Nfld.C.A.) at p. 471-2. 
Volume 1 Issue 7 
September 2001 
4
 and the officer’s understanding of them form the 
objective basis of articulable cause even though levels 
of suspicion have not risen sufficiently to permit an 
arrest based on reasonable grounds. The factors are 
not to be isolated and looked at individually and thus 
said to be insufficient. The factors must be viewed 
collectively as a whole in determining whether the 
circumstances gave rise to properly constituted 
articulable cause61. In short, the validity of the 
detention must be determined in relation to the 
circumstances that were apparent to the police 
officer. Of course, looking suspicious is not enough. 
The officer must be able to articulate reasons for 
their actions that may be judicially reviewed. 
 
The “constellation of objectively discernible facts” 
forming an articulable cause may collectively find a 
valid basis  anchored in the following:  
 
¾ Personal observations. Police may consider their 
personal observations such as the spatial proximity 
between the suspect and the crime62, temporal 
connection between the detention and the crime63, 
suspicious (peculiar) driving pattern64, furtive 
movements of occupants of vehicles65, an unnatural 
bulge in the clothing of the person66, or the 
unannounced arrival of a person at a building 
devoted entirely to a marihuana grow operation67. 
 
¾ Information. The officer is entitled to rely on 
information they receive from others, such as 
personal observations relayed by other persons 
including police colleagues (which may be assumed 
to be reliable68), information provided by an 
informant69, CPIC queries70, information bulletins, 
or other sources of reliable second hand 
information. Like reasonable grounds for belief, 
reasonable suspicion is dependent on both the 
content of the information provided to the police 
and its degree of reliability. Since the standard 
for reasonable suspicion is less demanding than 
that for reasonable belief, articulable cause may 
arise from information that is less reliable than 
that required to show reasonable grounds71.  
                                                 
61 R. v. Bullock [2000] O.J. No. 796 (Ont.Crt.J.) per Mossip J. at para. 24. 
62 U.S. v. Bush (2000) Case No. CR-3-99-046 (U.S.Dist.Crt.) 
63 U.S. v. Bush (2000) Case No. CR-3-99-046 (U.S.Dist.Crt.) 
64 R. v. Arkinstall [1994] B.C.J. No.612 (B.C.S.C.) at para.32. 
65 R. v. Arkinstall [1994] B.C.J. No.612 (B.C.S.C.) at para.32. 
66 R. v. F.L. [1996] B.C.J. No.3010 (B.C.S.C.) 
67 R. v. McAuley [1998] M.J. No.194 (Man.C.A.) 
68 In R. v. Lal [1998] B.C.J. No. 2446 (B.C.C.A.) leave to appeal to dismissed [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 28 
(S.C.C.,). However, the officer who provided the information must demonstrate a reasonable 
suspicion for the detention. 
69 See for example R. v. Devine [1996] Y.J. No.26 (Yuk.S.C.) where an anonymous tip that was 
reasonably specific and confirmed substantially provided a sufficient bassis for articulable cause. 
70 R. v. Cheng [1995] B.C.HJ. No.2838 (B.C.P.C.), 
 
¾ Experience. Experience is not to be discounted in 
the formulation of articulable cause72. The general 
category of experience may incorporate personal 
experience, corporate experience, and training73. 
"When assessing the objective grounds…it is 
proper to consider that the person drawing the 
inferences is a police officer with experience and 
training in investigating criminal activity"74. In 
addition, the officer may make rational inferences 
from the articulable facts to demonstrate the 
police suspected the person of unlawful behaviour. 
 
Like reasonable grounds for belief, the reputation of 
the individual or the reputation of the area, may 
contribute to articulable cause.  On the other hand, 
reputation alone, such as having a criminal record, 
would never provide articulable cause75. Similarly, 
attendance at a location of ongoing criminal activity, 
such as a crack house, may add to articulable cause. 
However, if the information about the area is of 
unknown age or reliability, no articulable cause exists 
and the police are not entitled to detain anyone who 
happened to be at the site of the suspected criminal 
activity76. 
 
Reasonably Justified 
 
When detaining a person, it is not sufficient that only an 
articulable cause exists. In addition to articulable cause, 
the detention must also be reasonably justified77. The 
justifiability requirements include the following: 
 
¾ reasonable proximity 
¾ reasonable duration 
¾ reasonable intensity 
 
Reasonable Proximity 
 
Investigative detention “is associated with unplanned … 
police investigations of contemporaneous crimes”78. 
With this in mind, the detention must occur 
sufficiently proximate with the criminal activity under 
                                                 
71 R. v. Lal {1998] B.C.J. No. 2446 (B.C.C.A.) at para.30. 
72 R. v. F.L. [1996] B.C.J. No. 3010 (B.C.S.C.) Lander J. at para. 15, R. v. Bullock [2000] O.J. No. 796 
(Ont.Crt.J.) per Mossip J. at para. 24. 
73 R. v. F.L. [1996] B.C.J. No. 3010 (B.C.S.C.) Lander J. at para. 15 
74 R. v. F.L. [1996] B.C.J. No. 3010 (B.C.S.C.) Lander J. at para. 15, R. v. C.M.G. [1996] M.J. No.428 
(Man.C.A.). 
75  R. v. Yau [1994] O.J. No. 60 (Ont.Crt.Jus) 
76 R. v. Simpson (1993) 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482 (Ont.C.A.) 
77 R. v. Simpson (1993) 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482 (Ont.C.A.) 
78 R. v. Ferris (1998126 C.C.C. (3d) 298 (B.C.C.A.) application for appeal to the S.C.C. dismissed 
[1998] S.C.C.A. No. 424 (S.C.C.) at p.302., see also R. v. Lee [1993] B.C.J. No.1220 (B.C.S.C.) 
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 investigation where immediate action is required to 
address the suspected crime. An investigative 
detention may be justified when the detention occurs 
during79 (engaged in), shortly after80 (just committed), 
or shortly before81 (about or poised to commit) the 
suspected unlawful activity. Because there is an 
urgency of police intervention, the reasonable suspicion 
of unlawful activity does not necessarily require an 
ascertainable crime or victim82.  
 
Recognizing that investigative detention involves a 
fluid, rapidly evolving, spontaneous, unplanned 
investigation, if a crime was committed in the distant 
past other investigative techniques should be 
considered by police (such as photo lineups, detailed 
follow-up interviews, crime scene analysis, surveillance, 
or informants). If nothing further arises to justify an 
arrest, the suspect must be left alone. The comments 
of Doherty J. in Simpson are apposite: 
 
[A] reasonably based suspicion that a person committed some 
property-related offence at a distant point in the past, while an 
articulable cause, would not, standing alone, justify the detention 
of that person on a public street to question him or her about 
that offence. On the other hand, a reasonable suspicion that a 
person had just committed a violent crime and was in flight from 
the scene of that crime could well justify some detention in an 
effort to quickly confirm or refute the suspicion. 
 
Reasonable Duration 
 
An investigative detention authorized by articulable 
cause is designed to be brief and must be for a 
reasonable duration in time83. The purpose of this 
momentary encounter is to clarify a suspicious (perhaps 
ambiguous) situation, and confirm or refute suspicion84. 
The length of the detention must not exceed what is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose, or reason, of the 
stop. Although there are no rigid time limitations, 
brevity is an important factor and each detention will 
be assessed on a case by case basis. In Lal85, an 18 
minute delay during an investigative detention while the 
officer was awaiting back-up required for a Code 5 
procedure on a suspected armed and dangerous driver, 
was found to be reasonable. During the temporary 
detention and the expeditious investigation undertaken 
by police, the officer's reasonably held suspicion may 
be dispelled (and the individual permitted to proceed), 
or may be elevated to reasonable grounds (and the 
individual subject to arrest). However, detention is not 
permitted for a lengthy or prolonged investigation nor 
to continue indefinitely to develop reasonable grounds 
upon which to justify an arrest. In short, the police 
must act “legitimately and responsibly86”. 
                                                 
79 R. v. Simpson (1993) 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482 (Ont.C.A.), R. v. Ferris (1998126 C.C.C. (3d) 298 (B.C.C.A.) 
application for appeal to the S.C.C. dismissed [1998] S.C.C.A. No. 424 (S.C.C.) 
80 R. v. Ferris (1998126 C.C.C. (3d) 298 (B.C.C.A.) application for appeal to the S.C.C. dismissed 
[1998] S.C.C.A. No. 424 (S.C.C.) at p.306, R. v. Johnson 
81 R. v. Ferris (1998126 C.C.C. (3d) 298 (B.C.C.A.) application for appeal to the S.C.C. dismissed 
[1998] S.C.C.A. No. 424 (S.C.C.) at p..306. 
82 R. v. Arkinstall [1994] B.C.J. No.612 (B.C.S.C.) 
83 See R. v. Dupuis (1994) 162 A.R. 97 (Alta.C.A.), R. v. Wainwright [1999] O.J. No. 3539 (Ont.C.A.) 
84 R. v. Simpson (1993) 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482 (Ont.C.A.) at p503. 
85 R. v. Lal (1996) Docket:CC940845 (B.C.S.C.) affirmed [1998] B.C.J. No. 2446 (B.C.C.A.) leave to 
appeal to dismissed [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 28 (S.C.C.), 
 
Reasonable Intensity 
 
Just as a person has an obligation to submit to a lawful 
arrest87, so too does a person who is subject to a 
lawful investigative detention88. Police officers "may 
use reasonable force in the exercise of their duties 
apart from their powers of arrest"89. If a person 
refuses to submit to a lawful detention, police are 
entitled to physically restrain the suspect. Similarly, if 
the person flees from police attempting to effectuate 
a lawful detention, the officer may pursue and 
physically restrain the person90.  
 
The police must not engage in any more intrusive a 
detention than is necessary in the circumstances91 and 
may detain a person only in a reasonable way92. The 
intensity, level of coercion, or use of active constraints 
imposed by police during an investigative detention 
must be reasonable under the circumstances and not 
unreasonably harsh.  A prismatic approach to affecting 
an investigative detention is calculated on the 
underlying circumstances confronting the officer at 
the time the detention is initiated. Verbal commands, 
handcuffing93, confinement to police vehicles94, or 
displaying of a police firearm95 may in some cases be 
warranted. Different variables may change the 
intensity of the detention and it may be necessary to 
engage the suspect at a more intense level at the 
genesis of the detention.  
 
When using restraint, the officer must be both 
flexible to the underlying factual predicate that 
initiated the detention as well as the reasonableness in 
which the restraint is affected. Physical restraint may 
be appropriate in those cases where the officer 
                                                 
86 R. v. Clarke [2001] O.J. No.66 (Ont.Crt.Jus.) 
87 See R. v. Whitfield [1970] S.C.R. 46 (S.C.C.) per Hall J., R. v. Richards (1999) Docket:C29243 
(Ont.C.A.) at para. 12. 
88 See R. v. Wainwright [1999] O.J. No. 3539 (Ont.C.A.) 
89 See Kellins v. Grotkopp 2000 BCSC 1137  
90 See R. v. Wainwright [1999] O.J. No. 3539 (Ont.C.A.) 
91 R. v. Bullock [2000] O.J. No. 796 (Ont.Crt.J.) per Mossip J. at para. 27. 
92 See R. v. Dupuis (1994) 162 A.R. 97 (Alta.C.A.) 
93 R. v. Ferris (1998126 C.C.C. (3d) 298 (B.C.C.A.) application for appeal to the S.C.C. dismissed 
[1998] S.C.C.A. No. 424 (S.C.C.) 
94 R. v. Elshaw (1989) 70 C.R. (3d) 197 (B.C.C.A.) reversed 67 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.) 
95 R. v. Dupuis (1994) 162 A.R. 97 (Alta.C.A.) 
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 encounters an uncooperative individual, the detention 
involves a violent crime, the individual raises a 
reasonable suspicion of flight or danger, or the officer 
is possessed with information the person may be 
armed. However, grossly excessive force, such as the 
unwarranted use of the lateral neck restraint to 
prevent a non violent or non threatening person from 
leaving an impaired driving investigation, will render the 
detention unlawful96.  
 
Searching: The Frisk 
 
Following an arrest, a police officer is entitled to 
search the arrested person for legitimate safety 
concerns (ie. weapons) and evidence. Are the police 
entitled to search a person who is subject to an 
investigative detention based on articulable cause? The 
courts have recognized that "in proper circumstances, 
a warrantless and non-consensual search may be lawful 
for the purpose of completing an on-site 
investigation97". Similar to the power of search 
incidental to arrest, “a search incident to detention is a 
valid exercise of police powers at common law only if 
the detention itself is lawful98”. A search incidental to 
investigative detention is only justified if related to 
officer safety. If not, such as searching for evidence, 
there can be no search99. The nature of the 
investigation (seriousness of the suspected offence) or 
the nature of the interaction (developing 
circumstances during the detention between the 
individual and the police100) will influence the decision 
to search and its intensity or scope.  
 
Similar to having an articulable cause to warrant the 
detention, the police must also have an articulable 
cause to search the suspect. The purpose of the 
protective search is to allow the officer, for security 
reasons, to search when concerned about the 
possibility that a detainee may have a weapon101 or may 
pose a danger or possess items that may aid in 
escape102. However, the officer must act out of a 
justifiable fear for personal safety and the search 
cannot be made vexatiously, arbitrarily or in 
furtherance of a collateral, ulterior, or oblique 
motive103.  
                                                 
                                                
96 R. v. Drda [1990] 26 M.V.R. (2d) 66 (B.C.S.C.) 
97 R. v. Osselaer (1999) Docket: X049086 (B.C.S.C.) per MaCaulay J. at para. 3. 
98 R. v. Murray (1999) 136 C.C.C. (3d) 197 (Que.C.A.) at p.212. 
99 R. v. Johnson (2000) Docket:CA025623 (B.C.C.A.) 
100 R. v. Cheng [1995] B.C.HJ. No.2838 (B.C.P.C.) In this case police initially stopped the accused for 
a traffic violation. During the course of the stop circumstances arose justifying a search for 
safety. 
101 R. v. Osselaer (1999) Docket: X049086 (B.C.S.C.) per MaCaulay J. at para. 3. 
102 R. v. Dalshaug [1991] B.C.J. No.3506 (B.C.S.C.) 
103 R. v. Murray (1999) 136 C.C.C. (3d) 197 (Que.C.A.) at p.209. 
In R. v. Ferris (1998) B.C.J. No. 1415 (B.C.C.A.) 
application for appeal to the S.C.C. dismissed [1998] 
S.C.C.A. No. 424 (S.C.C.) Ryan J.A. at para. 54-55 
stated: 
 
If the police have the duty to determine whether a person is 
engaged in crime or is about to be engaged in crime they should 
not be obliged to risk bodily harm to do so. It is my view that the 
police are entitled, if they are justified in believing that the 
person stopped is carrying a weapon, to search for weapons as an 
incident to detention. The question for the court must be 
whether the search was reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. 
 
I have concluded that in proper circumstance the police are 
entitled to search for weapons as an incident to an investigative 
stop. The seriousness of the circumstances which led to the stop 
will govern the decision whether to search at all, and if so, the 
scope of the search that is undertaken. …Questioning an elderly 
shopper about a suspected shoplifting would not ordinarily require 
a search for weapons; questioning someone after a bank robbery 
might require a search of the detainee and his or her immediate 
surroundings. In other words, such a search can meet the 
reasonable necessity test depending on the circumstances.  
 
In R. v. Lee [1993] B.C.J. No.1220 (B.C.S.C.), Hood J. 
held: 
 
If police officers are to effectively discharge their duties, then 
it is absolutely necessary that in the performance of them they 
feel and be as safe as the circumstances will permit. The duty to 
investigate, and to prevent, offenses, must of necessity have 
associated with it a legitimate self protection power to search. 
The safety and lives of officers on the street must be 
paramount. 
 
The concern for safety must be examined from the 
point of view of the officer at the time of search104 
and must be subjectively held and objectively 
appropriate “in all the circumstances”105. A “pat down 
search is ordinarily resorted to in such 
circumstances”106 to detect, by touch, the presence of 
a weapon. However, the wearing of a fanny pack107 or 
bulky jacket108 may provide justification for a more 
intrusive pocket search. In R. v. Wainiandy, [1995] A.J. 
No.131 (Alta.C.A.), the Court stated at para.6-7: 
 
What is a reasonable search for weapons turns on the precise 
circumstances of each case. Almost always, it will not be 
necessary to require the detainee to strip; sometimes it may not 
even be necessary to turn out pockets; sometimes, in less frantic 
circumstances than those here, the officers may be able to 
secure themselves from attack merely by means of a preliminary 
query of the detainee to account for his or her presence. 
 
 
104 R. v. Ferris (1998126 C.C.C. (3d) 298 (B.C.C.A.) application for appeal to the S.C.C. dismissed 
[1998] S.C.C.A. No. 424 (S.C.C.) at p.315. 
105 R. v. Cheng [1995] B.C.HJ. No.2838 (B.C.P.C.), 
106 R. v. Dalshaug [1991] B.C.J. No.3506 (B.C.S.C.) 
107 R. v. Ferris (1998126 C.C.C. (3d) 298 (B.C.C.A.) application for appeal to the S.C.C. dismissed 
[1998] S.C.C.A. No. 424 (S.C.C.) 
108 R. v. Wainiandy, [1995] A.J. No.131 (Alta.C.A.) 
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 Succinctly, the search, although connected to the 
detention, requires an articulable cause to suspect the 
detainee is armed or poses a threat to officer safety. 
Furthermore, the search must be proportional to its 
purpose, that of the discovery of weapons, and the 
intensity of the search, or degree of invasion, must 
also respect the dignity of the person. However, the 
degree of a search cannot be gauged to a nicety 
against the urgent circumstances facing the police 
officer109. 
 
Questioning 
 
Where the police have an articulable cause to suspect 
persons of unlawful behaviour, the police have the 
common law authority to question those persons110 even 
though a person is not obligated to answer the officer’s 
questions. The questioning carried out during the 
investigative detention must be pointed and direct, 
such as for the purpose of identification111 or 
explanation of presence in the area112. A reasonable 
explanation at this point may dispel the officer’s 
articulable cause and the individual will be free to 
proceed. An investigative detention, unlike a custodial 
arrest, does not permit a wide-ranging barrage of 
exploratory questions such as an extensive 
interrogation113. In R. v. Dimitriadis (1998) Docket: 
C21201 (Ont.C.A.) the Court found the brief 
questioning that followed detention concerning items in 
plain view was not an unjustifiable use of police powers.  
 
The Right to Counsel 
 
It is trite law that a person be informed of their 
s.10(b) rights upon arrest or detention114. Many of the 
appellate level Courts have not yet addressed a s.10 
argument stemming from an investigative detention. 
Most of the Charter debate involves s.9 (arbitrary 
detention) and s.8 (search and seizure) questions. It is 
unclear at what point the right to counsel must be 
provided during the course of an investigative 
detention. Although the s.10(b) right to counsel 
imports temporal immediacy115 and is not engaged by 
the length of the detention116, some courts suggest 
that the right to counsel need not be provided during 
the early stages of an investigative detention. For 
example, in R. v. Clough and Watts 2000 BCPC 0160, 
Gordon J. stated, at para 24: 
                                                 
109 R. v. Wainiandy, [1995] A.J. No.131 (Alta.C.A.) at para.6. 
110 R. v. Arkinstall [1994] B.C.J. No.612 (B.C.S.C.) at para.90. 
111 R. v. Simpson (1993) 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482 (Ont.C.A.) at p.503. 
112 R. v. Bullock [2000] O.J. No. 796 (Ont.Crt.J.) per Mossip J. at para. 27, R. v. Wainiandy, [1995] 
A.J. No.131 (Alta.C.A.) ta para.7. 
113 R. v. Simpson (1993) 79 C.C.C. (3d) 482 (Ont.C.A.) at p.503. 
114 R. v. Feeney[1997] 2 S.C.R. 13 at para.56. 
115 R. v. Feeney[1997] 2 S.C.R. 13, R. v. Poloshek ( ) 134 C.C.C. (3d) 187 (Ont.C.A.) 
116 R. v Elshaw (1991) 67 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.) at p.125 
 
[I]t seems ridiculous to suggest that a citizen who is detained 
briefly at the roadside such that a speeding ticket can be issued 
has a right to counsel. Neither does a citizen who is to be briefly 
detained for articulable cause such that the police can 
investigate an offence that is being or has been recently 
committed entitled to counsel. To hold otherwise would totally 
frustrate the day-to-day work of police officers. (emphasis 
added) 
 
In R. v. Reid [2000] O.J. No. 2969 (Ont.Crt.Jus.), 
Sparrow J. suggests the immediacy of s.10(b) rights 
does not "necessitate unreasonable conduct on the part 
of the police" and the police "must be permitted to 
react sensibly on the spur of the moment", perhaps to 
ask a question or two. In R. v. Dupuis (1995) 162 A.R. 
197 (Alta.C.A.), police entered a residence in pursuit of 
a suspect and at gunpoint required the occupants to lie 
down. The Court "concluded the police could detain 
while they pursued their enquiries without violating 
s.10(b) of the Charter"117. In light of a safety issue, 
the police are not required to advise the detainee of 
the right to counsel before they are searched. The 
police are entitled to pursue their investigation to a 
point where any risk of violence is removed before 
providing s.10(b) rights118. 
 
In the U.S., the Miranda119 warning required for 
custodial interrogation does not apply to investigative 
detention. Since the purpose of the stop is to enable 
the police to ask a moderate number of questions to 
resolve (confirm or dispel) suspicion, the Courts do not 
want to prevent unreasonable information gathering. 
The detainee is not obliged to answer the questions and 
if probable cause does not develop, the person must be 
released120. 
 
Perhaps s.1 of the Charter provides the answer, similar 
to the reasonable limit imposed when an officer detains 
an impaired driver on reasonable suspicion and is not 
obligated to provide the right to counsel prior to 
administering the roadside screening device or sobriety 
tests121. A conclusive answer to this question is eagerly 
awaited. 
 
 
                                                 
117 See comments of William J. in Swansburg v. Smith (1996) Docket:CA019235 (B.C.C.A.) 
118 R. v. Lal (1996) Docket:CC940845 (B.C.S.C.) affirmed [1998] B.C.J. No. 2446 (B.C.C.A.) leave to 
appeal to dismissed [1999] S.C.C.A. No. 28 (S.C.C.), 
119 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 
120 Berkemen v. McCarty 468 U.S. 420 (1984) 
121 See for example R. v. Sundquist 2000 SKCA 50. 
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